We cannot always prevent the murder of workers in an orchard or sleeping families, but we can set a high price for our blood. A price too high for the Arab settlement, the Arab army and the Arab government to pay. … [Retaliation operations] are not for vengeance. It is an act of punishment and warning, that if that state does not control its population and does not prevent them attacking us – the Israeli forces will cause havoc in its land.

  • IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, Lecture to IDF officers: “Retaliation Operations as a Means of Ensuring Peace”, July 1955 (Published in IDF monthly journal Skira Hodsheet, August 1955)

WHAT HAPPENED?

The Hamas offensive began shortly before 06:29 on October 7, 2023. By 10:00 IDF radars had detected approximately 2,200 rocket launches at dozens of Israeli cities, towns and villages between Gaza and the Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem-Beersheva line. During the day, Hamas and the other Palestinian militias fired many hundreds more; the exact number has not yet been reported.

The firing was conducted in salvos with multiple launchers in an attempt to penetrate the Iron Dome defense system. Many rockets landed in open areas, but even assuming a 95% success rate (the highest Iron Dome has ever achieved), that still means dozens of rockets that managed to hit inside Israeli cities, towns and villages. The number of fatalities and wounded is not very high relative to the size of the bombardment solely because of Iron Dome and the early-warning system that enabled most Israeli civilians to reach bomb shelters in time.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the rocket bombardment, Hamas troops began crossing the border into Israel at variety of locations. The majority had approached the border in tunnels, climbed out just before the underground wall built by Israel, and then, using explosives, broke through the above-ground obstacle of a steel-rod fence and advanced into Israel. Observation cameras monitoring the fence were shot up with small arms and RPG rockets. One group attacked and captured the civilian crossing into Israel at Erez where 20,000 Palestinian civilians cross daily into Israel to work and where hundreds of trucks transit with goods. A small group crossed the border using paragliders (parachutes with small propeller engines) and a final group attacked from the sea, landing on an Israeli beach. (Of this group only a few got through; most were intercepted by Israeli navy patrol boats and strike-drones).

All together, within the first couple of hours, more than 1,000 Hamas troops crossed the border into Israel in approximately 15 to 30 locations (different sources have provided different numbers) and then fanned out in groups to attack Israeli civilians and military positions. They entered two Israeli towns and 12 villages (at least), driving through the streets shooting at passersby and breaking into houses to kill the residents. In three locations they captured buildings and held the occupants as hostages. The biggest such case included 50 people of all ages at Kibbutz Be’eri who were herded into the communal dining room.

One group reached a large nature-party (like a rave party but held outdoors in nature) where approximately 3,000 young Israelis, mostly in their twenties, had gathered to dance. They attacked them with grenades and assault rifles, then chased the fleeing group, hunting down people who had sought to hide in the low brush. This is probably the location where the largest number of casualties was inflicted. The IDF and police units reaching this area have spent the past two days fighting off remaining teams of terrorists and collecting survivors and bodies.

One large and a few small IDF bases along the border were also attacked in the first rush, pinning down the outnumbered troops at those locations to fight for survival rather than assist the civilians who were simultaneously under attack.

The first responders in the civilian residential areas were local response teams of IDF reservists living in the villages (usually 10 to 20 people per village). They grabbed their weapons and ran out to face the attackers together with a few on-duty policemen in the towns. Here and there, Israelis with private weapons (pistols) also attempted to face the Hamas teams, who were armed with assault rifles.

The IDF units in the area were initially busy trying to fend off the surprise assault, so the first organized IDF response took a few hours as units located in other areas of Israel were rushed to the Gaza border. On arrival, they began trying to understand what was happening and determining how to allocate themselves to deal with the situation, including formulating a means of protecting villages not yet attacked in the initial strike. They began gradually counterattacking inside the villages captured by Hamas forces, combing the areas to find and kill the terrorists. Once a Hamas force was deemed destroyed, the IDF units evacuated Israeli residents who had locked themselves inside their homes during the onslaught. They also surrounded Hamas teams holding hostages.

The IDF units have been going through residential areas house by house, room by room, searching for terrorists to kill or capture and collecting Israeli survivors and bodies. The evacuated residents are being sent north to central Israel where they are being hosted by kibbutzim (communal villages), public facilities (converted schools), and private citizens who are donating rooms in their homes. Other units combed the areas between the villages to search for scattered civilians – especially from the nature-party – and other Hamas teams that might be hiding there waiting for an opportunity to strike when things seemed to calm down.

All the hostages held in Israeli territory have been rescued, but approximately 130 Israelis (the figure claimed by a Hamas spokesperson), including civilians both male and female, the elderly, young children, and soldiers were kidnapped and taken into Gaza. Hamas claims it has placed them in underground installations.

By the early afternoon of October 8, the number of confirmed Israeli casualties had reached at least 700 killed (some expect it to rise to over 1,000) and 2,240 wounded (some with grave injuries, so they might yet die) who have reached hospitals. There are at least another 700 Israeli citizens whose names are known but who are unaccounted for (some might be dead and not yet discovered; others might be among the kidnapped; others might still be in hiding somewhere and out of touch). There are probably more missing whose names are not yet known.

Hamas casualties are currently estimated to be at least 400 killed and almost 2,000 wounded. These figures include those hit inside Israel and those hit in Israeli counterstrikes in Gaza. Dozens more have been captured. Since these numbers were declared, there have been numerous skirmishes as IDF troops continue to comb the residential and open areas to a distance of several kilometers from the border with Gaza.

In an amphibious raid into Gaza, Israeli naval commandos captured a senior commander of the Hamas naval commando force.

The Israeli government has declared war and ordered the IDF to conduct a mass mobilization of reserves. It also ordered the beginning of an aerial offensive response on Hamas targets in Gaza. The initial strikes were delayed to allow Palestinian civilians living in the buildings and vicinity to evacuate as urged by the IDF using various means of communication – radio, telephone calls, etc.

By the evening of October 8, it was reported that about 75,000 Gaza residents had relocated to designated safe areas, clearing the declared areas for free action by the IDF. In the late evening of that night, the Israeli air force struck approximately 800 targets in Gaza and the navy struck some more. They included residential buildings used by Hamas for hiding command posts, combat positions and storage sites, two banks, numerous weapons storage sites, and some launchers of Hamas and other armed groups. In addition, Hamas troops moving to and from the border, between combat positions and launch sites, etc., were detected by surveillance drones and attacked.

The mobilization of reserves is not only for Gaza. Some IDF units are heading to the border with Lebanon in case Hezbollah decides to join the war; others are reinforcing the forces in Judea and Samaria or replacing regular units being sent to Gaza. Residents in some of the Israeli villages along the Lebanese border are being evacuated.

 OTHER EVENTS

Shortly after 07:00 on October 8, Hezbollah fired a number of mortar bombs at an Israeli strongpoint on the border with Lebanon. The IDF returned fire with artillery. At time of writing, it is not clear whether this exchange was a harbinger for an escalation or an isolated incident.

In Egypt, an Egyptian policeman opened fire on a bus of Israeli tourists, killing two and wounding a few more. He also killed an Egyptian.

In east Jerusalem Arab residents began rioting. There have also been sporadic attacks throughout Judea and Samaria.

WHY NOW?

The answer to this question is not clear.

Several excuses were quickly published – such as the fact that Jews were allowed to pray on the Temple Mount, which Hamas sees as an infringement of an exclusive Muslim privilege. But only two days passed from that event till the attack. The extent and level of organization of this offensive prove that it had been planned and prepared for a far longer period of time.

Some believe Hamas felt it had to pressure Israel to improve the dire economic situation in Gaza. However, Israel has been acting to improve Gaza’s economic situation (including allowing 20,000 Gazans to cross the border every day to work in Israel). This attack will worsen Gazans’ economic situation, not help it. So this too is not a feasible argument.

Another theory is that this action was fomented by Iran. Hamas and Hezbollah officials have stated that Iran backed it, assisted in the planning, and approved the offensive. They have no particular reason to lie about this, though crediting Iran could be a ploy of psychological warfare – enhancing Iran’s image as a Middle Eastern power to be feared by its enemies.

Iran’s envoy to the UN has denied Iranian involvement. However, Iran’s backing, physical support in funds and weapons, and urging have been documented behind the surge in terror attacks in and emanating from Judea and Samaria over the past two years. In 2019 there were 1,346 terror attacks against Israelis in or emanating from Judea and Samaria; in 2020 there were 1,320. In 2021, the number leaped to 2,135 and in 2022 increased again, to 2,613. From January to August 2023 there were 1,502 attacks against Israelis. Though there were several intense cycles of fighting on the Gaza border during the same period, most of the time that border was almost quiet.

There is some logic to possible Iranian involvement in the current attack. Iran is deeply displeased with the progress in discussions on an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia – an agreement initiated very much as a treaty of cooperation against the common Iranian threat. Just last week, Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, stated that Saudi Arabia is “betting on a losing horse”. The theory goes that the current attack was to prove Israel’s weakness and give the Saudis second thoughts.

However, there is a weakness to this theory. A combined attack with Hezbollah would seem to have been a better way of proving Israel’s limitations. A Hezbollah offensive could yet be in the offing, but Israel is now more awake to the possibility and is preparing for it. Logic seems to dictate that a simultaneous offensive (like the simultaneous Egyptian-Syrian offensive in 1973) would have been a better course of action. There could, of course, be reasons why Iran might prefer a disjointed offensive – to pull the IDF into Gaza and then attack from Lebanon while it is being taxed in the south, for example. Or there might have been problems of coordination.

To sum it up – we do not yet know.

WHY THE HAMAS SUCCESS?

This is an issue that will require a very intensive inquiry after the war.

The supreme source of the failure is totally that of the intelligence services, which had concluded that Hamas was more interested in the economic well-being of its population than in furthering its ideological agenda by initiating a war that would damage that population’s well-being. In line with this supposition, the government made various decisions to help the Gazan economy. But more importantly, the IDF assumed that the current scenario was simply not on the table and convinced the government that that was the case. How Hamas managed to plan, organize, and assemble its forces without Israeli intelligence services discovering it will need a very deep analysis once the war is over.

While the details differ and will only come to light in an inquiry, in principle, this is the 1973 fiasco all over again.

The second failure is a long-term one, and not just a failure of this government but of Israeli society in general and IDF senior commanders over the past 20 years. It stems from the insufficient manpower available on a routine basis to man the IDF’s missions. This has always been a problem and has objective roots in the size of our population, the percentage of budget Israel can allocate to defense, and the extent of damage to the economy that is created by mobilizing reserves.

But this problem has been exacerbated by a 25-year shift in strategy concocted at the IDF’s most senior levels, based on new Western concepts of what wars are and how they are conducted. The result was a deliberate reduction in size of IDF reserves in general and the number of days per year that they serve. This created a built-in shortage of available troops per mission the IDF is required to conduct.

This shortage was dealt with by constantly shifting troops and taking risks in areas considered less imminently threatening. The recent need to reinforce IDF units in Judea and Samaria due to the escalation of attacks there caused the IDF to reduce its forces along the Gaza border – and why not, since IDF intelligence assessed that Hamas was not going to conduct a major offensive in the foreseeable future (see intelligence analysis above).

Text from the interrogation of a Hamas terrorist captured by the IDF has been published, and it illustrates the extent of the complete failure of Israel’s intelligence services. According to him:

  • Hamas had been preparing this attack for more than a year.
  • Hamas was encouraged by the political demonstrations in Israel, seeing them as a sign of Israeli weakness.
  • The past weeks’ riots conducted by Hamas were a deception to enable them to prepare their attack and hide the preparations.
  • The attack force included 1,000 men who broke through the border fence at 15 locations (as noted above, other sources claim more locations).
  • This terrorist and his unit were surprised that the IDF was not waiting for them. They operated inside Israel for about five hours before they met armed resistance.

WHAT NEXT?

At time of writing (early afternoon on October 8), a few active terrorists remain inside Israel. The IDF is still busy clearing its territory of remnants of these Hamas teams. The question is, what comes afterwards?

I am not privy to the decisions of the rival leaders, so my answer to this question must be regarded as conjecture.

Hamas is understandably overjoyed at its success, which is the worst defeat inflicted on Israel since October 6, 1973.

The quote from Moshe Dayan at the beginning of this article, stated nearly 70 years ago, encapsulates Israel’s situation and the necessary strategy it must implement, albeit adapted to today’s conditions. It is not a foolproof strategy or an easy one to implement successfully, but it is probably the only one that has the potential, if successful, of ensuring a better situation in future. What it cannot achieve, just as it did not achieve it when implemented by Dayan himself and his successors, is eternal peace. Better vigilance and better preparation for future threats will have to be implemented too.

The Israeli government has declared its intention to conduct a major counter-offensive on Hamas in Gaza, the objective of which is to inflict mass casualties and destruction to the Hamas organization, personnel and equipment. But it has not indicated the methods or timeline (other than to say it will be a long war).

Experience has shown that a purely aerial offensive, as conducted in the past, even if significantly intensified, cannot achieve this objective. So it appears that a ground offensive will be conducted sooner or later, even if at first there is a prolonged aerial offensive to prepare the way. This will require preparation and will bring IDF units into dense urban terrain that favors the Hamas defenders who have considerably fortified it and trained in it. It therefore risks suffering heavy IDF casualties. It also risks inflicting major casualties to Palestinian civilians and prompting severe criticism by Israel’s only major international supporter, the US.

It will also take a long time to complete, and international support is unlikely to last very long. During Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, after a month in which 135 Israelis were killed in terrorist attacks, the US government initially accepted Israel’s need to conduct the operation and then demanded that it halt it midway. Another example occurred during the 2014 war with Gaza, when the US government and Europe tried to force Israeli concessions to Hamas. They were blocked by Egypt, which controls one of the borders of Gaza and views Hamas as a hostile ally of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Obama went so far as to deny Israel replenishment of a key armament item it had requested. After the public calls of commiseration have subsided, it is an open question how the US and Europe will actually act. As of right now, the US government is stating full support for Israel.

Furthermore, the longer the IDF is busy fighting in Gaza, the less it will be prepared for fighting on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts, having lost personnel both killed and wounded and used up stocks of supplies and funds for purchasing more. Thus the risk of another front opening up grows over time.

The final question that must be answered is this. Even if the Israeli counter-offensive is completely and rapidly successful, what then? Hamas rules Gaza because the majority of the population believes in its agenda. In the last democratic election to the Palestinian Authority parliament in January 2006, Hamas won the majority of seats. That is why Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, has consistently refused to conduct elections ever since. He is fully aware, and this is backed by the polls, that Hamas would gain an even higher proportion of seats. So if Hamas is thrown out of power in Gaza, who will replace it? Will the IDF have to stay there and conduct a non-stop counter-guerrilla campaign while attempting to provide administrative services to the population? That is the last thing Israel wants. The alternative is to withdraw and let the various factions fight each other for control. But given what is known about the opinions of the Palestinian populace, either Hamas will recover its organization and position or its only strong rival, the even more extreme Palestinian Islamic Jihad, might.

These are the questions Israel’s government and military must answer to achieve a better situation at the end of this catastrophic debacle.

 

Dr. Eado Hecht, a senior research fellow at the BESA Center, is a military analyst focusing mainly on the relationship between military theory, military doctrine, and military practice. He teaches courses on military theory and military history at Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, and Reichman University and in a variety of courses in the Israel Defense Forces.

The Weather of Summer 2023 Was the Most Extreme Yet

Even compared to the intensifying severe-weather events of recent years, this season was exceptional, marked by historic heat, wildfires, and storms.

The deadliest U.S. wildfire in more than a century scorched Lahaina, Hawaii.

In Libya, torrential rains fell in volumes rarely seen, leading to devastating floods that destroyed a quarter of the city of Derna.

Extreme heat struck Europe, where several countries shattered temperature records

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ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ ΠΕΡΕΧΟΜΕΝΩΝ
ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ 
ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ 
Ιστορικό υπόβαθρο 
Δολοφονία Tellini και κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας 
Γαλλική υψηλή στρατηγική 
ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ 1

ΕΙΣΑΓΩΓΗ
Η ελληνοϊταλική κρίση του 1923 προέκυψε στις 27 Αυγούστου, ύστερα από την δολοφονία από αγνώστους σε ελληνικό έδαφος, του Στρατηγού Enrico Tellini και των λοιπών μελών της ιταλικής αντιπροσωπείας που συμμετείχαν στη Διεθνή Επιτροπή για τη διαχάραξη της ελληνοαλβανικής μεθορίου και κορυφώθηκε με την ιταλική κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας στις 31 Αυγούστου, η οποία τερματίστηκε στις 27 Σεπτεμβρίου.
Η εν λόγω κρίση δεν είναι γνωστή στο ευρύ κοινό αν και αποτέλεσε το πρώτο μεγάλο τεστ της Κοινωνίας των Εθνών (ΚτΕ), θέτοντας σε διακινδύνευση την διεθνή ειρήνη και την αξιοπιστία των κανόνων του Διεθνούς Δικαίου.
 
Ταυτόχρονα σηματοδότησε το έναυσμα της επιθετικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής του Benito Mussolini, ο οποίος έχοντας ανέλθει στην εξουσία στα τέλη του 1922, ανέμενε την κατάλληλη ευκαιρία για να την παρουσιάσει τόσο στη διεθνή κοινότητα όσο και στο ιταλικό κοινό. Σκοπός της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η παρουσίαση των γεγονότων που οδήγησαν στην ελληνοϊταλική κρίση του 1923 και η εξέταση της γαλλικής υψηλής στρατηγικής στο πλαίσιο αυτής, καθώς μπορεί η Ιταλία να κλιμάκωσε την κρίση, η Γαλλία όμως έπαιξε κυρίαρχο ρόλο στην έκβασή της.

ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ
Ιστορικό υπόβαθρο
Το τέλος του Α’ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου βρήκε τόσο την Ελλάδα όσο και την Ιταλία στο στρατόπεδο των νικητών, αλλά οι συνθήκες που είχε διαμορφώσει ο πόλεμος θα ταλάνιζαν για πολλά χρόνια τον ευρωπαϊκό χώρο. Στην Ελλάδα, η άδοξη κατάληξη της Μικρασιατικής εκστρατείας επέφερε το τέλος της Μεγάλης Ιδέας, η οποία επί έναν αιώνα περίπου υπήρξε ο ακρογωνιαίος λίθος της ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Ο αλυτρωτισμός πέρασε πλέον στα χέρια ιδιωτικών οργανώσεων, οι οποίες συντηρούσαν ζητήματα των αλύτρωτων περιοχών, με το επίσημο κράτος να δείχνει ανοχή αλλά όχι ενεργή συμμετοχή. Πλέον το δόγμα της Ελλάδας περιστρεφόταν γύρω από την διατήρηση του υπάρχοντος καθεστώτος. Ταυτόχρονα η εσωτερική κατάσταση χαρακτηριζόταν από πολιτική αστάθεια και κοινωνικές εντάσεις. Η εξουσία πέρασε στα χέρια μιας «επαναστατικής» κυβέρνησης υπό τον Συνταγματάρχη Στυλιανό Γονατά το φθινόπωρο του 1922, οι έριδες μεταξύ βενιζελικών και βασιλικών ήταν σε έξαρση, ενώ την ίδια στιγμή η χώρα είχε να αντιμετωπίσει το φλέγον ζήτημα των προσφύγων.

Η εσωτερική κατάσταση της Ιταλίας την επαύριον του πολέμου υπήρξε εξίσου ταραχώδης. Τα εδαφικά κέρδη που αποκόμισε η Ιταλία θεωρήθηκαν ανεπαρκή για τις θυσίες της και επέτειναν ένα αίσθημα ανικανοποίητου εθνικισμού που είχε ως στόχο την οικοδόμηση μιας αυτοκρατορίας. Ταυτόχρονα ο πληθωρισμός, ο κορεσμός της αγοράς εργασίας, η αποδιοργάνωση της επιχειρηματικής δραστηριότητας συνεπεία απεργιών και της έλλειψης πρόσβασης σε ξένες αγορές και η άνοδος του ριζοσπαστισμού, οδήγησαν σε ισχυρή αμφισβήτηση του ιταλικού πολιτικού σκηνικού και τελικά έδωσε την ευκαιρία στον Mussolini να ανέλθει στην εξουσία τον Οκτώβριο του 1922, επιβάλλοντας φασιστικό καθεστώς.

Δολοφονία Tellini και κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας
Από το καλοκαίρι του 1923 ο Moussolini υιοθέτησε μια επιθετική εξωτερική πολιτική ξεκινώντας με την κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας. Οι βλέψεις εναντίον ελληνικών εδαφών δεν ήταν κάτι καινούργιο αλλά είχαν εκδηλωθεί από την ίδρυση του ιταλικού κράτους. Την πρόφαση για την προσχεδιασμένη κατάληψη του νησιού αποτέλεσε η δολοφονία του Ιταλού Στρατηγού Enrico Tellini και τεσσάρων μελών της ιταλικής αντιπροσωπείας που συμμετείχε μαζί με την αντίστοιχη ελληνική και αλβανική, στη Διεθνή Επιτροπή για τη χάραξη της ελληνοαλβανικής μεθορίου.

Στις 27 Αυγούστου οι αντιπροσωπείες θα πραγματοποιούσαν αναγνώριση στην κοιλάδα του Δρίνου, έχοντας ορίσει ως τόπο συνάντησης το ελληνικό φυλάκιο της Κακαβιάς στις 09:00. Κατά τη μετάβαση της ιταλικής αντιπροσωπείας και καθώς εκινείτο επί του δρόμου Ιωαννίνων – Κακαβιάς έπεσε σε ενέδρα πλησίον των συνόρων, με αποτέλεσμα τη δολοφονία όλων των μελών της. , Αν και η δολοφονία έγινε από αγνώστους, η Ιταλία έσπευσε να κατηγορήσει την Ελλάδα και αφού απέτυχε να αποσπάσει έγκριση από Βρετανία και Γαλλία για κάθε πιθανή ιταλική απάντηση, απέστειλε προς αυτή στις 29 Αυγούστου, μία ρηματική διακοίνωση υπό μορφή 24ωρου τελεσιγράφου, που ανέσυρε μνήμες του τελεσιγράφου της Αυστροουγγαρίας προς τη Σερβία το 1914. Αξίζει να τονιστεί ότι σύμφωνα με αρκετές πηγές οι δράστες ήταν Αλβανοί, ενώ σύμφωνα με ορισμένους ιστορικούς όπως ο Alan Cassels και ο James Barros, ο Mussolini συγκαταλέγεται μεταξύ των υπόπτων που κρύβονταν πίσω από το περιστατικό.

Η διακοίνωση της Ιταλίας περιείχε ιδιαιτέρως σκληρούς όρους, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι δεν υπήρχαν αποδείξεις περί ελληνικής υπαιτιότητας. Πιο συγκεκριμένα η Ρώμη αξίωνε:
α. Επίσημη συγγνώμη ενώπιον της ιταλικής διπλωματικής αποστολής στην Αθήνα.
β. Την τέλεση μνημοσύνου για τα θύματα, παρουσία της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης.
γ. Την απόδοση στρατιωτικών τιμών στις σορούς των θυμάτων.
δ. Την απόδοση τιμών στην ιταλική σημαία.
ε. Την θανατική ποινή για τους ενόχους.
στ.Αποζημίωση 50.000.000 λιρετών εντός πέντε ημερών από τη διακοίνωση.

Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση απάντησε την επομένη, αποδεχόμενη τους τέσσερεις πρώτους όρους με τροποποιήσεις, ενώ απέρριψε τους τρεις τελευταίους καθόσον έθιγαν την τιμή και την κυριαρχία της χώρας. Παράλληλα δήλωσε ότι ήταν διατεθειμένη να προσφύγει στην ΚτΕ και να δεχθεί τις αποφάσεις της, σε περίπτωση ιταλικής απόρριψης της ελληνικής ρηματικής διακοίνωσης. Μην αναμένοντας την ελληνική απάντηση και επιδεικνύοντας περιφρόνηση για την ΚτΕ, ο Mussolini έδρασε μονομερώς, δίνοντας εντολή στις 30 Αυγούστου στον ιταλικό στόλο να αποπλεύσει προς κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας. Η αμεσότητα με την οποία έδρασε η Ιταλία για την κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι αυτή η επιχείρηση είχε ήδη σχεδιαστεί στο πλαίσιο ιταλικών αντιποίνων έναντι πιθανών ελληνικών αντιδράσεων που θα προέκυπταν από την ιταλική προσάρτηση των Δωδεκανήσων, η οποία είχε οριστεί για τις 30 Αυγούστου. ,

Το πρωί της 31ης Αυγούστου μια δύναμη δεκαεπτά πλοίων του ιταλικού ναυτικού, συνοδευόμενη από ένα υποβρύχιο και τέσσερα υδροπλάνα έκαναν την εμφάνισή τους στα ανοιχτά της Κέρκυρας, λαμβάνοντας θέσεις μάχης. Περί τις 15:00 μ.μ., ο Πλοίαρχος Antonio Foschini συνοδευόμενος από τον Υποπλοίαρχο Tsordini, μετέβησαν στη Νομαρχία προκειμένου να επιδώσουν στον νομάρχη Πέτρο Ευριπαίο, ένα έγγραφο σύμφωνα με το οποίο είχε προθεσμία μισής ώρας να παραδώσει το νησί, χωρίς καμία αντίσταση.
 
Ο Ευριπαίος αιτήθηκε χρόνο για να επικοινωνήσει με την κυβέρνηση κάτι που δεν δέχθηκε ο Foschini και αφού κατηγόρησε τον τελευταίο για παραβίαση της κατοχυρωμένης ουδετερότητας της Κέρκυρας, τον ενημέρωσε ότι το νησί στερείτο στρατιωτικών δυνατοτήτων ενώ τα δύο φρούριά της δεν διέθεταν οπλισμό και φιλοξενούσαν Μικρασιάτες πρόσφυγες, γεγονός που γνώριζε ο επικεφαλής της ναυτικής δύναμης, Αντιναύαρχος Emilio Solari.

Περί ώρας 16:30 η ιταλική αντιπροσωπεία αποχώρησε, δίδοντας ένα σημείωμα με τους όρους παράδοσης και γνωστοποιώντας πως αν ως τις 17:00 δεν είχε υψωθεί λευκή σημαία στον ιστό του παλαιού φρουρίου, θα ξεκινούσε η απόβαση των ιταλικών στρατευμάτων κατόπιν τριών άσφαιρων κανονιοβολισμών. Στις 17:00, οι τρεις άσφαιροι κανονιοβολισμοί, ακολουθήθηκαν από τον βομβαρδισμό του παλαιού και του νέου φρουρίου. Ύστερα από έναν 25λεπτο βομβαρδισμό που κόστισε τη ζωή περίπου 15 και τον τραυματισμό τουλάχιστον 35 ατόμων, αποφασίσθηκε η παράδοση του νησιού και ακολούθησε η αποβίβαση των στρατευμάτων εισβολής.

Η Ελλάδα προσέφυγε την 1 Σεπτεμβρίου στην Κ.τ.Ε ορίζοντας ως αντιπρόσωπο της τον Νικόλαο Πολίτη, επικαλούμενη τα άρθρα 12 και 15 της Συνθήκης περί παραπομπής σε διαιτησία από την Συνέλευση, οποιασδήποτε διαφοράς ενδέχεται να προκαλέσει ρήξη. , Η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας ως ζήτημα που απειλούσε τη διεθνή ειρήνη ενέπιπτε στην αρμοδιότητα της ΚτΕ, όμως η άστοχη ενέργεια της Ελλάδας, στο πλαίσιο επίδειξης καλής θελήσεως, να ζητήσει με διακοίνωσή της στις 2 Σεπτεμβρίου, τη σύσταση ανακριτικής επιτροπής από την Πρεσβευτική Συνδιάσκεψη για τη δολοφονία, υπέσκαψε τη στρατηγική της υπέρ της παραπομπής του ζητήματος στην ΚτΕ.
 
Η Βρετανία ήταν υπέρ της αρμοδιότητας της ΚτΕ καθώς έβλεπε το γεγονός ως αμφισβήτηση βασικών αξιών που είχαν κλονιστεί από ένα δικτάτορα. Οι Γάλλοι από την άλλη, αντιτίθεντο σε αυτό ανησυχώντας ότι θα δημιουργούσε προηγούμενο για την ανάμιξη της ΚτΕ στη γαλλική κατοχή του Ruhr. Αντ’ αυτού προτιμούσαν την εξέταση της υπόθεσης από την Πρεσβευτική Συνδιάσκεψη όπου η βρετανική αντίδραση θα αδρανοποιείτο από τη γαλλική και την ιταλική αντιπροσωπεία.
 
Ο Mussolini ενίσχυσε τη γαλλική στάση, απειλώντας ότι θα αποχωρήσει από την ΚτΕ αν επιληφθεί του ζητήματος. Ως εκ τούτου, στερούμενη τη γαλλική υποστήριξη, η Βρετανία υπαναχώρησε από την αρχική της θέση περί αρμοδιότητας της ΚτΕ. Τελικώς λόγω πολιτικών σκοπιμοτήτων το ζήτημα παραπέμφθηκε στην Πρεσβευτική Συνδιάσκεψη όπου ανέλαβε τη διερεύνηση της δολοφονίας Tellini και υποχρέωσε την Ελλάδα να καταβάλει αποζημίωση 50.000.000 λιρετών στην Ιταλία, παρά το γεγονός ότι το πόρισμα της επιτροπής διερεύνησης απέκλεισε κάθε ευθύνη της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης για τη δολοφονία.
Κατ’ αυτό τον τρόπο το κύρος της Ιταλίας διεσώθη και οι Γάλλοι απέφυγαν μια επικίνδυνη σύνδεση μεταξύ Κέρκυρας και Ruhr, εις βάρος της Ελλάδας. Ο Mussolini αρνήθηκε αρχικά να αποχωρήσει από την Κέρκυρα, όπου η ιταλική κατοχή είχε αρχίσει να παρουσιάζει σημάδια μονιμότητας, αλλά μετά από βρετανικές πιέσεις και πληροφορίες του ιταλικού ναυτικού που παρουσίαζαν την ανωτερότητα του βρετανικού στόλου, υποχώρησε και οι Ιταλοί αποσύρθηκαν από το νησί στις 27 Σεπτεμβρίου.

Γαλλική υψηλή στρατηγική
Η γαλλική στρατηγική μετά τον Α’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο στόχευε πρωτίστως στην εξασφάλιση της πολιτικοστρατιωτικής ασφάλειας της Γαλλίας έναντι μιας νέας γερμανικής απειλής. Η δραστηριοποίηση για τον περιορισμό της γερμανικής ισχύος ώστε η Γερμανία να παραμείνει σε καθεστώς ήττας και απομόνωσης, ήταν η κύρια επιδίωξη της γαλλικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Η πλήρης εφαρμογή της Συνθήκης των Βερσαλλιών και ιδίως των προβλέψεων περί επανορθώσεων, η σύναψη συμμαχιών στρεφομένων κατά του Βερολίνου και η χρήση στρατιωτικής βίας, αποτέλεσαν εργαλεία αυτής της πολιτικής.

Σύμφωνα με τον Walter McDougall η γαλλική στρατηγική περιλάμβανε:
α. Την επίτευξη εγγυήσεων που θα διασφάλιζαν ζωτικά συμφέροντα στους τομείς της στρατιωτικής και οικονομικής ασφάλειας και της βιομηχανικής ανάπτυξης.
β. Την αποτροπή της ανάκαμψης της Γερμανίας, η οποία θα την έφερνε σε θέση οικονομικής και στρατιωτικής κυριαρχίας στην Ευρώπη.

Η συνθήκη των Βερσαλλιών εξυπηρετούσε αυτό το σκοπό αλλά καθώς τόσο η συμμαχική αλληλεγγύη όσο και η γερμανική συνεργασία, που ήταν απαραίτητα στοιχεία εκτέλεσης των όρων της συνθήκης, δεν εξασφαλίστηκαν, η Γαλλία προχώρησε σε μια στρατηγική περιορισμού της γερμανικής κυριαρχίας στις περιοχές της Ρηνανίας και του Ruhr. Η αποδυνάμωση της Γερμανίας θα οδηγούσε μεταξύ άλλων σε μια ισότητα μεταξύ γαλλικών και γερμανικών δυνατοτήτων και στην επιβίωση της Γαλλίας ως Μεγάλης Δύναμης.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό η Γαλλία εισέβαλε τον Ιανουάριο του 1923 στο Ruhr σε μια προσπάθεια να υπερβεί το τέλμα στο οποίο είχε περιέλθει η διεθνής πολιτική το 1922 σχετικά με το θέμα των πολεμικών επανορθώσεων και να φέρει τη Γαλλία σε θέση ισχύος, αναγκάζοντας τη Γερμανία να παραδεχθεί την ήττα της και την υποχρέωσή της σχετικά με τις επανορθώσεις καθώς και να υποχρεώσει ΗΠΑ και Βρετανία να προβούν σε χορήγηση δανείου προς της Γερμανία ώστε να σταθεροποιηθεί το μάρκο και να ξεκινήσει η αποπληρωμή των επανορθώσεων.

Στο επίπεδο της υψηλής στρατηγικής, η γαλλική πολιτική επηρεάστηκε από τρεις ασυμβίβαστες μεταξύ τους επιλογές:
α. Τη διατήρηση μιας γαλλοβρετανικής “entente” ως υποκατάστατο της Συνθήκης Εγγύησης (Treaty of Guarantee), την οποία δεν επικύρωσε η αμερικανική γερουσία και με την οποία ΗΠΑ και Βρετανία εγγυούνταν τα γαλλικά σύνορα έναντι γερμανικής επιθετικότητας.
β. Τη δημιουργία μιας γαλλογερμανικής “entente” που μεταφραζόταν σε εμπορική και βιομηχανική συνεργασία και τη συμμόρφωση της Γερμανίας με τις προβλέψεις της Συνθήκης των Βερσαλλιών.
γ. Την προώθηση ενός ιδιαίτερου καθεστώτος για τη Ρηνανία, προκειμένου να εξασφαλιστούν οι επανορθώσεις και η εθνική ασφάλεια, αποτρέποντας μια γερμανική ανάκαμψη. ,

Με τα ανωτέρω κατά νου μπορεί να εξηγηθεί η στάση της Γαλλίας στην ελληνοϊταλική κρίση του 1923, μια στάση που εδράζεται πρωτίστως στην εξυπηρέτηση των εθνικών συμφερόντων αυτής και δευτερευόντως στην ιδεολογία.

Την περίοδο 1900-1940 η γαλλική πολιτική αντιμετώπιζε την Ιταλία ως εξισορροπητικό παράγοντα στις σχέσεις του Παρισιού πρωτίστως με το Λονδίνο και το Βερολίνο. Ο Poincaré αν και αρνήθηκε λευκή επιταγή στον Mussolini προσπάθησε να παραπέμψει την ελληνοϊταλική κρίση στην Πρεσβευτική Συνδιάσκεψη, την οποία μπορούσε να ελέγξει ως πρόεδρος της και ταυτόχρονα εισηγήθηκε κυρώσεις εναντίον της Ελλάδας, μέσω αυτής.

Οι λόγοι της γαλλικής στάσης μπορούν να συνοψιστούν ως εξής:
α. Ο Poincaré ήθελε να προστατεύσει την πολιτική του στο Ruhr, η κατοχή του οποίου έφερνε τη Γαλλία αντιμέτωπη με τη Βρετανία και τη Γερμανία. Επομένως συνεπεία της ρήξης με τη Βρετανία, η σύμπλευση της Ιταλίας με το γαλλοβελγικό μπλοκ ήταν απαραίτητη ώστε να υπάρξει ευνοϊκή αναλογία 3:1 στην Επιτροπή Επανορθώσεων.
β. Η αναγνώριση της αρμοδιότητας της ΚτΕ στην επίλυση του ζητήματος της Κέρκυρας, θα μπορούσε να οδηγήσει σε ανάλογη εξέταση του ζητήματος του Ruhr από το ίδιο όργανο. Η αγνόηση της Ιταλίας για παράκαμψη της ΚτΕ θα μπορούσε να την οδηγήσει σε μια άβολη για τη Γαλλία, σύγκριση μεταξύ της κατοχής των δύο περιοχών.
γ. Η γαλλική ηγεσία ανησυχούσε ότι πιθανή ήττα του Mussolini στο ζήτημα της Κέρκυρας, ενδέχετο να προκαλέσει τριγμούς στην ιταλική πολιτική σκηνή. Ο Poincaré ως συντηρητικός, απέρριπτε μεν τις μεθόδους του Mussolini, αλλά εκτιμούσε τις αντικολεκτιβιστικές και αντιδιεθνιστικές απόψεις του και έβρισκε τον ιταλικό φασισμό λιγότερο ενοχλητικό από τον κομμουνισμό και τον σοσιαλισμό.
δ. Στους υπολογισμούς της γαλλικής ηγεσίας, για το ζήτημα της Κέρκυρας, έπαιξε ρόλο η αντίληψή της για την επερχόμενη σύγκρουση μεταξύ Ιταλίας και Γιουγκοσλαβίας για την πόλη Fiume.

Εν κατακλείδι, η κατοχή του Ruhr αποτελούσε τον κυριότερο προσδιοριστικό παράγοντα της γαλλικής πολιτικής το 1923.

ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΑ
   
Η ελληνοϊταλική κρίση του 1923 επιβεβαιώνει τις βασικές αρχές της ρεαλιστικής σχολής. Η ρήση από το διάλογο μεταξύ Αθηναίων και Μηλίων, «ο ισχυρός επιβάλλει ό,τι του επιτρέπει η δύναμή του και ο αδύνατος υποχωρεί όσο του επιβάλλει η αδυναμία του» καθώς και η άποψη ότι οι διεθνείς οργανισμοί υπάρχουν για να εξυπηρετούν τα συμφέροντα των ισχυρών, βρίσκουν απόλυτη εφαρμογή στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση.
Η Ελλάδα, μια μικρή χώρα βρέθηκε κατηγορούμενη για τη δολοφονία της ιταλικής αντιπροσωπείας, ένα έγκλημα για το οποίο δεν υπήρχε καμία απόδειξη για πιθανή εμπλοκή της. Αναμφίβολα η Ελλάδα ως φιλοξενούσα χώρα είχε ευθύνη για την ασφάλεια των ξένων αντιπροσωπειών, όμως η ιταλική κατηγορία υπερέβαινε αυτή τη διάσταση κάνοντας λόγο για ενοχή, κάτι εντελώς αβάσιμο. Ταυτόχρονα, η Ιταλία έχοντας διαπράξει μια πολύ σοβαρότερη παράβαση του Διεθνούς Δικαίου με τον βομβαρδισμό και το θάνατο αθώων Ελλήνων πολιτών, την παραβίαση της ελληνικής κυριαρχίας και τη διακινδύνευση της διεθνούς ειρήνης, έμεινε στο απυρόβλητο. Εν ολίγοις η αδικία που υπέστη η Ελλάδα στα χέρια της Πρεσβευτικής Συνδιάσκεψης, ήταν το τίμημα για τη διατήρηση της ειρήνης, μιας ειρήνης σε βάρος της δικαιοσύνης. Όπως ανέφερε προφητικά ο Σουηδός εκπρόσωπος στην ΚτΕ, Karl Hjalmar Branting, «η ειρήνη που δεν βασίζεται στη δικαιοσύνη, περιέχει μέσα της τα σπέρματα μελλοντικών συγκρούσεων».

Για τη νεότευκτη ΚτΕ, η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας ήταν μια από τις πρώτες δοκιμασίες που κατέδειξαν την αναποτελεσματικότητα του θεσμού και την αδυναμία του να διαφυλάξει την ειρήνη όταν εμπλέκονταν τα συμφέροντα μεγάλων δυνάμεων. Την επόμενη δεκαετία, η ιαπωνική κατάληψη της Μαντζουρίας (1931), η ιταλική εισβολή στην Αιθιοπία (1935) και η τσεχοσλοβακική κρίση (1938) οδήγησαν στην απαξίωση του θεσμού. Αντίστοιχη αδυναμία διαφύλαξης της διεθνούς ασφάλειας και ειρήνης παρατηρείται ακόμη και σήμερα στον διάδοχο της ΚτΕ, τον Οργανισμό Ηνωμένων Εθνών με πιο πρόσφατο παράδειγμα τον πόλεμο στην Ουκρανία.

Η προσχεδιασμένη κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας και το ζήτημα του Fiume αποτελούσαν πτυχές της ίδιας επιθετικής ιταλικής πολιτικής, που εδραζόταν σε έναν ανεκπλήρωτο ιμπεριαλισμό ενώ ταυτόχρονα προσέφερε στον Mussolini μια ευκαιρία εδραίωσης της εξουσίας του στο εσωτερικό. Ο Mussolini περιφρονώντας την ΚτΕ, εισήγαγε μια νέα μορφή κυνικής διπλωματίας, με διαπραγματεύσεις που διεξάγονταν με κακή πίστη. Μια διπλωματία που έφθασε στο αποκορύφωμά της, την επόμενη δεκαετία και ανήγαγε τη χρήση βίας σε prima ratio για την επίτευξη των εθνικών στόχων.

Τα ιταλικά σχέδια εκμεταλλεύθηκαν την κατάσταση της Ελλάδας και συγκεκριμένα:
α. Τη στρατιωτική, οικονομική και κοινωνική αναταραχή που είχε προκαλέσει ο Α’ Π.Π. και η Μικρασιατική εκστρατεία.
β. Την έλλειψη ομοψυχίας συνεπεία του εθνικού διχασμού.
γ. Το καθεστώς αποστρατικοποίησης της Κέρκυρας.
δ. Τη διεθνή απομόνωση της χώρας.

Η Γαλλία με τη στάση της κατόρθωσε να διαφυλάξει βραχυπρόθεσμα τα συμφέροντά της καθώς η κρίση δεν συσχετίστηκε με την πολιτική της στο Ruhr. Μακροπρόθεσμα όμως, η ζημιά στο γόητρο της ΚτΕ της κόστισε καθώς αρκετοί Γάλλοι θεωρούσαν ότι μέσω της ΚτΕ, η χώρα θα μπορούσε να διαδραματίσει ηγετικό ρόλο, προστατεύοντας τα συμφέροντά της έναντι της Γερμανίας. Ταυτόχρονα αποτέλεσε σημείο τριβής για τις γαλλοβρετανικές σχέσεις. Η κρίση όμως έλαβε και μια ιδεολογική χροιά, διχάζοντας την γαλλική πολιτική σκηνή, με τους συντηρητικούς να υπερασπίζονται την πολιτική Mussolini και τους σοσιαλιστές να την καταδικάζουν.

Η εν λόγω κρίση τονίζει την αρχή της αυτοβοήθειας εντός του άναρχου διεθνούς συστήματος. Αναμφίβολα οι κανόνες Διεθνούς Δικαίου είναι σημαντικοί, πλην όμως η κινητήρια δύναμη της διεθνούς πολιτικής παραμένει το εθνικό συμφέρον και το νόμισμα αυτής, η ισχύς. Όπως αναφέρει ο Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης οι θεσμοί είναι τεχνητές κατασκευές και όταν παραμερίζονται ξεπροβάλει το πραγματικό πρόσωπο της Φύσης, ο νόμος της ισχύος. Εξού και η ανάγκη για συνεχή αναβάθμιση των ελληνικών συντελεστών ισχύος και δη της σκληρής ισχύος, καθώς η γειτνίαση με ασταθή υποσυστήματα ασφαλείας και οι τουρκικές απειλές, δεν αφήνουν περιθώρια εφησυχασμού.

Η διεθνής απομόνωση της χώρας ήταν κάτι που το πλήρωσε τόσο το 1923 όσο και το 1897, διακινδυνεύοντας την έκβαση του μετέπειτα Μακεδονικού Αγώνα. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο είναι απαραίτητη η αποχή από ενέργειες που οδηγούν σε περιθωριοποίηση της χώρας. Η συμμετοχή σε διεθνείς οργανισμούς και συμμαχίες και η ενεργητική διπλωματία, είναι παράγοντες που δύνανται να ενισχύσουν το κρατικό κύρος και τη σημασία της χώρας σε περιφερειακό και διεθνές επίπεδο.

Η αμυντική αδυναμία της Κέρκυρας έπαιξε σημαντικό ρόλο στην ιταλική απόφαση για κατάληψη της. Το γεγονός αυτό τονίζει την ανάγκη αμυντικής θωράκισης των νησιών του ανατολικού Αιγαίου, τη στιγμή που η τουρκική επιθετική ρητορική έχει κλιμακωθεί σημαντικά, εγείροντας έξω από κάθε έννοια δικαίου και λογικής ζήτημα αποστρατικοποίησης αυτών και συνδέοντας το εξίσου παράνομα με το καθεστώς κυριαρχίας. Στο πνεύμα του «ό,τι απειλείται δεν αποστρατιωτικοποιείται», η Ελλάδα θα πρέπει να προβεί σε έναν ορθολογικό αμυντικό σχεδιασμό που θα εξασφαλίζει την εδαφική ακεραιότητα της ηπειρωτικής και νησιωτικής της επικράτειας. Καθώς ο κατακερματισμός του ελληνικού χώρου προσφέρει πλεονέκτημα στον αντίπαλο και με δεδομένη την αριθμητική του υπεροπλία, θα πρέπει ο σχεδιασμός να επιτυγχάνει τη βέλτιστη ισορροπία μεταξύ δύο βασικών αναγκών:
α. Την προβολή ικανοποιητικής άμυνας έως την άφιξη ενισχύσεων.
β. Την συγκέντρωση δυνάμεων και την αποφυγή κατακερματισμού αυτών, τουλάχιστον έως ότου προσδιορισθεί η εχθρική κύρια προσπάθεια.

ΠΗΓΕΣ – ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ
ΠΗΓΕΣ  Ιστοσελίδες
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Μαλαμής, Β. (χ.χ.). Η δολοφονία Τελίνι και η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας (Αύγουστος-Σεπτέμβριος 1923). [Διαδίκτυο] Διαθέσιμο στο: https://www.academia.edu/37673382/%CE%97_%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1_%CE%A4%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%AF%CE%BD%CE%B9_%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9_%CE%B7_%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%AC%CE%BB%CE%B7%CF%88%CE%B7_%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%82_%CE%9A%CE%AD%CF%81%CE%BA%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%82_%CE%91%CF%8D%CE%B3%CE%BF%CF%85%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%A3%CE%B5%CF%80%CF%84%CE%AD%CE%BC%CE%B2%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%82_1923_  [Προσπελάστηκε 17/4/22].
Παπαφλωράτος, Σ. Ι. (2017). Ο Βομβαρδισμός και η κατάληψη της Κέρκυρας από τους Ιταλούς το 1923 (31 Αυγούστου – 27 Σεπτεμβρίου). [Διαδίκτυο] Διαθέσιμο στο: https://clioturbata.com/%CE%B1%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%88%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B9%CF%89%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%BD%CE%B7%CF%83-%CF%83-%CF%80%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%B1%CF%86%CE%BB%CF%89%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%83-%CE%BF-%CE%B2%CE%BF%CE%BC%CE%B2%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%B4%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%BF/  [Προσπελάστηκε 17/4/22]

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΓΡΑΦΙΑ
α. Ελληνόγλωσση
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Γκράτσι, Ε. (1980). Η αρχή του τέλους: Η επιχείρηση κατά της Ελλάδος (μτφρ. Χρυσώ Γκίκα). Αθήνα: Βιβλιοπωλείον της Εστίας.
Clogg, R. (2012). Σύντομη ιστορία της νεώτερης Ελλάδας (μτφρ. Χάρης Φουντέας). Αθήνα: Α. Καρδαμίτσα.
Γρηγοριάδης, Σ. (1976). Τα φοβερά ντοκουμέντα: Υπόθεση Κέρκυρας Αύγουστος 1923. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Φυτράκη.
Δαφνής, Γ. (1955): Η Ελλάς μεταξύ δύο πολέμων 1923-1940 (τεύχος Β’). Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Ίκαρος.
Θουκυδίδου Ιστορία, Ε 89.
Κονδύλης, Π. (1992). Η ηδονή, η ισχύς και η ουτοπία. Αθήνα: Στιγμή.
Κουσκουβέλης, Ι. Η. (2010). Εισαγωγή στις διεθνείς σχέσεις. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Ποιότητα.
Παπαρρηγόπουλος, Ι. (2009). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (τόμος 25). Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Τέσσερα Πι Α.Ε.
Παπαφλωράτος, Ι. (2019). Η Ελληνοϊταλική κρίση του 1923: Το επεισόδιο Tellini/Κέρκυρας. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Πελασγός.
Παπαφλωράτος. Σ. Ι. (2021). Η εξωτερική πολιτική και η υψηλή στρατηγική των Μεγάλων Δυνάμεων και των Βαλκανικών κρατών: Συμπεριλαμβανομένων Ελλάδος – Τουρκίας. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Λειμών.
Στεφανίδης, Δ. Ι. (1997). Ο τελευταίος Ευρωπαϊκός αιώνας: Διπλωματία και πολιτική δυνάμεων (1871-1945). Αθήνα: Προσκήνιο.
Τσάμης, Ε. (2015). Η υψηλή στρατηγική της Μεγάλης Βρετανίας, Γαλλίας, Γερμανίας και Ιταλίας στη διάρκεια του μεσοπολέμου: Ανάλυση και συμπεράσματα. (Διπλωματική εργασία). Θεσσαλονίκη: Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας. Ανακτήθηκε την 17/422 από: https://dspace.lib.uom.gr/handle/2159/18466
Χατζηιωσήφ, Χ. (επιμ.) (2009). Όψεις πολιτικής και οικονομικής ιστορίας 1900-1940. Αθήνα: Εκδόσεις Βιβλιόραμα.

β. Ξενόγλωσση
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Cassels, A. (1970). Mussolini’s early diplomacy. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press.
Duggan, C. (2008). The force of destiny: A history of Italy since 1796. New York (N.Y.): Houghton Mifflin Company.
Finney, B. P. (1993). The relations between the Entente powers and Greece, 1923-6 (Διδακτορική διατριβή). Leeds: University of Leeds. Ανακτήθηκε την 18/4/22 από: https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/669/
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Ruches, J. P. (1965). Albania's Captives. Chicago (IL): Argonaut.
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Φωτογραφικό υλικό
Εικόνα 1: Φωτογραφία από τον τόπο της δολοφονίας της ιταλικής αντιπροσωπείας.
Εικόνα 2: Enrico Tellini
Εικόνα 3: Πέτρος Ευριπαίος
Εικόνα 4: Emilio Solari
Εικόνα 5: Πρωτοσέλιδο της εφημερίδας «Η Καθημερινή» της 1/9/1923.
Εικόνα 6: Ιταλικά γραμματόσημα με την ένδειξη «Κέρκυρα».
Εικόνα 7: Πρωτοσέλιδο της εφημερίδας Corriere della Sera της 1/9/1923.
Εικόνα 8: Πρωτοσέλιδο της εφημερίδας La Stampa της 1/9/1923.
Εικόνα 9: Αποβίβαση ιταλικών στρατευμάτων στην Κέρκυρα.
Εικόνα 10: Ιταλική προκήρυξη που αφισοκολλήθηκε στην Κέρκυρα μετά την κατάληψή της

 Στις αρχές της προηγούμενης δεκαετίας η Αίγυπτος αποτέλεσε μία εκ των χωρών που συνταράχθηκε από τις «Αραβικές Εξεγέρσεις». Ως ακόλουθο γεγονός της εξέγερσης στην Τυνησία, στις 25 Ιανουαρίου του 2011 ξεκινούν στο Κάιρο αντικυβερνητικές διαδηλώσεις. Η κινητοποίηση των πολιτών αποτέλεσε την κατάληξη μακροχρόνιων πολιτικών, κοινωνικών και οικονομικών αιτιών. Οι οικονομικοί παράγοντες αντικατοπτρίζονται και αλληλεπιδρούν με το εκάστοτε πολιτικό και κοινωνικό πλαίσιο αναφοράς. Οι άσχημες οικονομικές συνθήκες στην Αίγυπτο επιτάχυναν και τις διαδικασίες στο κοινωνικό και πολιτικό πεδίο. Η έλλειψη δημοκρατικών διαδικασιών σταδιακά δημιούργησε τις συνθήκες για να αρθρωθούν αιτήματα για την ανάγκη πολιτικής μετάβασης και την εγκαθίδρυση ενός λιγότερου αυταρχικού καθεστώτος.

Η σημαντικότερη όμως συνέπεια της αιγυπτιακής πτυχής του φαινόμενου των «αραβικών εξεγέρσεων» καταδείχθηκε πως ήταν ο «εύθραυστος» χαρακτήρας των πολιτικών και κοινωνικών δομών της χώρας. Η άσχημη οικονομική κατάσταση και η αστάθεια, μετά την ανατροπή του Χόσνι Μουμπάρκ, (Hosni Mubarak) ενίσχυσε τα κοινωνικά και πολιτικά ερείσματα της «Μουσουλμανικής Αδελφότητας». Στις εκλογές της 30ης Ιουνίου του 2012 εξελέγη Πρόεδρος της Αιγύπτου ο Μοχάμεντ Μόρσι (Mohamed Morsi) προερχόμενος και υποστηριζόμενος από τους «Αδελφούς Μουσουλμάνους»˙ τυπικά κατήλθε στην εκλογική αναμέτρηση ως υποψήφιος του «Κόμματος Ελευθερίας και Δικαιοσύνης».

Οι σαθρές οικονομικές δομές της αιγυπτιακής οικονομίας, απόρροια της τριακονταετούς διακυβέρνησης του Χόσνι Μουμπάρακ, με τον έντονα κρατικιστικό χαρακτήρα, υπέσκαψε την προσπάθεια δυναμικής ενσωμάτωσης της αιγυπτιακής οικονομίας στο διεθνοποιημένο οικονομικό σύστημα. Η οικονομική δυσπραγία εξακολουθεί να διασαλεύει την σταθερότητα της χώρας, την απρόσκοπτη καθεστωτική της μετάβαση και την σταθερή διεθνοπολιτική της πορεία.

Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, τα ευρωπαϊκά κράτη και το Ισραήλ, εκλαμβάνουν την ομαλή πολιτική και οικονομική μεταρρύθμιση της Αιγύπτου ως την ασφαλιστική δικλείδα, για να αποτραπεί το ενδεχόμενο να εκμεταλλευτούν εκ νέου την κοινωνική δυσαρέσκεια και ένα ενδεχόμενο κενό εξουσίας μη-αρεστά «εξτρεμιστικά στοιχεία». Όπως αποδείχθηκε η οικονομική σταθερότητα στην Αίγυπτο αποτελεί εκ των ων ουκ άνευ για την συνέχιση της πολιτικής μετάβασης και κυρίως την φιλοδυτική της εξωτερική πολιτική, πτυχή της οποίας αποτελεί και η διευρυμένη συνεργασία με την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο.

Τον Δεκεμβρίου του 2022 ο Πρόεδρος της Αίγυπτου Αλ Σίσι υπέγραψε διάταγμα με το οποίο καθορίζονται μονομερώς τα θαλάσσια σύνορα της χώρας του με τη Λιβύη. Με την εν λόγω ενέργεια η Αίγυπτος κατέδειξε την αντίθεσή της με την τουρκική αυθαιρεσία επιβολής της «Γαλάζιας Πατρίδας», στην νοτιοδυτική της πτυχή. Επίσης, παρωθεί την Λιβύη να εγκαταλείψει την παράνομη συμφωνία με την Τουρκία και να ξεκινήσει διαπραγματεύσεις με την Αίγυπτο αλλά και την Ελλάδα για την οριοθέτηση των θαλασσίων τους συνόρων. Γενικότερα, η συγκεκριμένη απόφαση μας παρέχει μία ξεκάθαρη εικόνα σχετικά με τον τρόπο που η Αίγυπτος αντιλαμβάνεται την οριοθέτηση των περιοχών θαλάσσιας δικαιοδοσίας στην Αν. Μεσόγειο.

Η προγενέστερη οριοθέτηση της Αιγύπτου με την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία, σύμφωνα με την αρχή της μέσης γραμμής, η προ τριετίας μερική οριοθέτηση με την Ελλάδα όπως και η πρόσφατη μονομερής απόφασή της για την Λιβύη καταδεικνύουν την αιγυπτιακή βούληση να καταστεί το Κάιρο ρυθμιστής των εξελίξεων. Αναμφίβολα η αιγυπτιακή κίνηση σκοπό έχει να αποτρέψει τους τουρκικούς σχεδιασμούς δυτικά, όχι όμως στο σύνολό τους, γεγονός που διεφάνη με την έως σήμερα απροθυμία της για πλήρη οριοθέτηση με την Ελλάδα ή την προσφυγή σε αρμόδιο δικαιοδοτικό όργανο, Χάγη ή Αμβούργο.

Οι πολύ-επίπεδες σχέσεις Ελλάδος - Κύπρου - Αιγύπτου είναι αναμφίβολα προς την σωστή κατεύθυνση, η εξελικτική τους δυναμική θα κριθεί όμως από την αξιοπιστία των μερών να ελέγξουν κατά προτεραιότητα τον τουρκικό αναθεωρητισμό.

Η πρόσφατη ελληνική απόφαση να επανεκκινήσει τον ελληνοτουρκικό διάλογο, δίχως προηγουμένως η Τουρκία να έχει αλλάξει ούτε κατά κεραία τους αναθεωρητικούς της στόχους –παρά μόνο στο επίπεδο της καθημερινής υπόμνησής τους μέσω της στρατιωτικής δραστηριότητας– θέτει εκ των πραγμάτων εύλογα ερωτήματα για την Αίγυπτο σχετικά με την στρατηγική αξιοπιστία της Ελλάδας.

Αν το Κάιρο θεωρήσει ότι η Αθήνα είναι έτοιμη να αποδεχθεί μέρος των τουρκικών αξιώσεων στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο το στρατηγικά αναμενόμενο είναι η Αίγυπτος να προσεγγίσει την Τουρκία για να αποκομίσει μεγαλύτερα οφέλη.

Editor's note:

This piece is part of a series of policy analyses entitled “The Talbott Papers on Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” named in honor of American statesman and former Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott. Brookings is grateful to Trustee Phil Knight for his generous support of the Brookings Foreign Policy program. 

Located next door to the raging war in Ukraine, Poland has become a new focal point of migration in Europe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), almost 14 million crossings have been recorded from Ukraine to Poland since February 24, 2022, and nearly 1 million Ukrainians are currently recorded as refugees in the country of nearly 38 million inhabitants. As of August 8, the UNHCR registers approximately 4.6 million Ukrainian refugees across Europe (excluding Russia). The European continent has not seen such levels of displacement — in both speed and scale — since World War II. In the wake of the Russian invasion, both the Polish government and civil society welcomed Ukrainian refugees with open arms and massive support efforts. The European Union’s Temporary Protection Directive, adopted just days after Russia’s attack, further facilitated the humanitarian response by granting Ukrainians immediate legal status to reside in member states and rights to access services.

Just a few months earlier, however, thousands of migrants and asylum-seekers from Africa and the Middle East were left stranded in the forest separating Poland and Belarus, forcefully turned away by Polish border guards at the gates of the European Union. The Belarusian government began weaponizing migrants as a political tool in mid-2021, resulting in several thousand individuals primarily from Iraq and Syria arriving to enter Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia via Belarus in order to seek asylum in countries within the EU. Rather than offering safety, however, the Polish government announced a state of emergency and constructed a 186-kilometer border wall to thwart any crossing attempts. The emergency order also denied aid workers, journalists, and civil society groups access to the border area and criminalized any effort to help migrants trapped in the forest.

View of the wall erected to prevent migrant crossing on Polish-Belarusian border
A view of the wall erected to prevent migrant crossings on the Polish-Belarusian border amid a migrant crisis near Kuznica, Poland, June 30, 2022. REUTERS/Kacper Pempel

The about-face in policy toward asylum-seekers is not unique to Poland. Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, analysts have highlighted the sharp discrepancy between the treatment of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers. At land borders and at sea, migrants and asylum-seekers seeking to reach Europe from North Africa and Turkey continue to be forcefully turned back in now-commonplace violations of EU and international law. On June 14, 2023, for example, over 500 asylum-seekers and migrants were estimated to have lost their lives in a single shipwreck in the central Mediterranean as the Greek coast guard watched.

Even after asylum-seekers arrive, Europe’s disparate policies have concrete implications at the local level for the towns and cities hosting refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants. Amidst persistent global conflicts, worsening climate change, and the economic fallout of the pandemic and the war, Europe saw the number of non-Ukrainian asylum applications increase to over 900,000 in 2022 — levels not seen since 2016. Yet support for non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers has been hindered by a lengthy asylum process, relatively lower civil society and political resources compared to the Ukrainian response, and staffing and housing shortages.

In June, the Council of the European Union announced an initial agreement as part of negotiations on a broader pact on asylum and migration management. The proposal includes expanded border detention centers and a procedure whereby asylum-seekers would be relocated to cities and towns in EU states less exposed to migration. It also proposes EU states would pay up to 20,000 euros per asylum-seeker if they refuse to accept such relocations. The next step will be negotiations between the council and the EU Parliament. Observers have argued that the proposal is overly focused on border enforcement and detention and does little to build off the positive lessons of the Ukraine response. Even if approved, however, the pact would reportedly not enter into force until 2026.

Research and the successes of the Ukrainian response have shown that asylum-seekers and refugees can contribute to local economies and societies if given the right support, particularly as countries across Europe grapple with aging workforces and labor shortages. As policymakers work to design migration and asylum policy in Europe, the legal frameworks, political will for solutions, and civil society mobilization for Ukrainian refugees can provide a roadmap for improving policies for refugees and asylum-seekers in Europe more broadly.

Figure 1 https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine Open Link to see figures!
Demographic and socioeconomic factors shape unique vulnerabilities Under European and international law, states have an obligation to uphold the right of individuals to seek asylum regardless of their country of origin. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol — of which all EU members are signatories — obliges states to accord protection to all individuals with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” National origin legally cannot be a basis for discrimination in the asylum process. The different demographics, educational backgrounds, experiences of violence and displacement, and the journey to Europe nevertheless all shape refugees and asylum-seekers’ local integration experiences and access to the labor market and must inform government policy facilitating integration once refugees and asylum-seekers arrive. Ukrainian refugees displaced by the war differ in several respects from previous groups of asylum-seekers seeking protection in Europe. Men aged 18-60 years have been prohibited from leaving the country due to martial law. A UNHCR monitoring exercise conducted between October 2022 and August 2023 found that 85% of members of households interviewed are women and children.1 About one-third of household members are minors under 18 years of age, among whom approximately 80% are school-aged children between 5-17 years and 20% infants between 0-4 years. Of all households interviewed, 44% include at least one school-aged child and 15% include at least one infant. The Ukrainians interviewed also have high levels of educational attainment: almost 50% completed tertiary education, including postgraduate degrees, and an additional 29% underwent vocational training. Prior to leaving their homes, over half of Ukrainian refugees were employed. Ukrainians also overwhelmingly carry a national identity document. A prior version of the UNHCR’s survey (conducted from May to November 2022) found that 74% of interviewed Ukrainians had a biometric passport, enabling rapid registration for protection and benefits under the Temporary Protection Directive. Finally, due to proximity and remaining ties at home, 26% of Ukrainians residing in neighboring countries have visited Ukraine at least once since their initial departure. In contrast, the almost 1 million non-Ukrainians who applied for asylum in the EU in 2022 are of diverse national backgrounds and demographic composition. People who sought asylum came from countries across the globe, with Syrians and Afghans representing the top two nationalities at around 130,000 individuals each. The third-largest group came from Turkey, with Venezuela and Colombia close behind. Those fleeing war and persecution are arriving alongside individuals fleeing the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, slow or fast-onset environmental disasters, and fragile governments. Displacement is often multi-causal, and existing legal asylum frameworks do not provide protection for factors including climate change-induced displacement.                                                                                Figure 2  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA__custom_7000181/default/table?lang=en Open Link to see figures!                                                                                                                                                                   
In terms of gender, 71% of total asylum applications in 2022 were submitted by males and 29% by females. This gender discrepancy has been attributed by researchers to factors including the extreme difficulty and danger of reaching Europe and women’s limited socioeconomic rights and resources in origin countries and first-destination countries of refuge. Over 240,000 individuals — about one-quarter of applicants — were under 18 years old, of which 59% were boys and 41% were girls. Nearly one-fifth of children arrived unaccompanied by a parent or legal guardian. Finally, identity verification is a key requirement in establishing protection needs and accessing support services, especially country of origin and age. The absence of travel and identity documents upon arrival — due to displacement conditions or incidents during the journey — can often prolong the review process. In Germany, for example, the proportion of asylum-seekers without official documentation has decreased in recent years, though approximately 45% of applicants in 2021 still lacked passports or ID cards.  Studies of the 2015-16 European refugee crisis found that educational background varied widely across countries of origin. In Germany, for example, a study conducted in 2015 found that greater proportions of asylum-seekers from Iraq and Syria held tertiary degrees than other groups, and a majority had attained secondary education. Monitoring surveys conducted in 2016 and 2017 on the Eastern Mediterranean route (Serbia, Greece, North Macedonia, and Hungary) by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) found a lower level of educational attainment for irregular migrants and asylum-seekers across all countries of origin compared to Ukrainian refugees. Over 50% of respondents interviewed held secondary degrees, while approximately 16% had attained tertiary education and approximately 6% had no formal education. However, this data does not reflect the educational profile of asylum-seekers and migrants arriving in 2022 and 2023. Overall, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers arriving in Europe have often attained higher educational levels than non-migrants from their countries of origin.These demographic and socio-economic differences between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees and asylum-seekers shape migrants’ specific vulnerabilities and needs, which in turn affect the formulation of adequate reception and integration policies. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has highlighted that female-led refugee households face significant challenges due to the double burden of childcare and economic support. Research shows that women and children refugees are also more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. At the same time, Ukrainians’ high level of educational attainment and diasporic connections have likely facilitated their labor market integration amid European worker shortages. For non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers, documentation challenges and the broad range of displacement reasons present barriers during the asylum process. After receiving asylum status, lower educational attainment and smaller diasporic networks are factors in accessing employment. Among the key differences between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees and asylum-seekers have been the divergent EU and national legal frameworks and political and societal mobilization that have met these two populations. Yet while these factors play a role in integration, the European Union and its constituent governments hold the legal responsibility to protect all refugees seeking protection. As examined below, among the key differences between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees and asylum-seekers have been the divergent EU and national legal frameworks and political and societal mobilization that have met these two populations. For Ukrainians, these frameworks and support have substantially mitigated the challenges faced by vulnerable groups including female-headed households. For non-Ukrainians, the current asylum process often exacerbates challenges facing asylum-seekers and communities, and support after asylum is insufficient in helping integration.

Where there’s a will, there’s a way: Europe’s response to Ukrainian refugees

The response to Ukrainian displacement in Europe was both historic and unique. Within two weeks after Russia’s full-scale attack, over 1.5 million refugees had crossed into Poland via the Polish-Ukrainian border. The speed and scale of the exodus led the European Union to adopt the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time since its establishment in 2001. Originally developed in the wake of the Yugoslav Wars to provide emergency protections in instances of mass displacement, the directive had never been triggered, even during the sharp increase in refugees and asylum-seekers fleeing Syria and other war-torn countries in 2015. On March 4, 2022 — eight days after the Russian invasion — the European Union invoked the directive, granting Ukrainians who apply for the TPD immediate legal status to reside in member states and rights to access housing, employment, education, and social services. At the level of civil society, Europeans quickly mobilized to support refugees. A combination of political will and social solidarity enabled a remarkably effective reception of refugees in the days and weeks after the outbreak of the war.

Politically, the EU directive was a crucial mechanism for national governments to accept and accommodate Ukrainian refugees in a short time with minimal bureaucratic hurdles. The immediate provision of legal status avoided long backlogs in already-stretched asylum systems. Authorizations to seek employment and education and access to housing as well as social and medical benefits at least in principle created the possibility for Ukrainians to settle quickly in their host countries. National governments published websites in Ukrainian with information on how to register for temporary protection and access services and expanded opportunities for learning the host country’s language.

At the civil society level, not only were Ukrainians perceived as fellow Europeans, but the attack on Ukraine was viewed as an affront to Europeans’ own democratic way of life and a threat to their future security. The large Ukrainian diaspora of over 1.5 million legal residents predating the full-scale war also played an instrumental role in the massive mobilization efforts. Local organizations and private individuals — even beyond Ukraine’s neighbors — raised money and coordinated rides to the border to transport people to specific locations and welcome centers. Refugees who had existing networks often moved in with their contacts, and private households signed up to open their homes to strangers as host families. Others stayed temporarily in collective reception sites but were generally moved quickly into houses or apartments rented by local governments. An OECD survey conducted between April and August of 2022 suggested that over one-quarter (27%) of Ukrainian refugees lived in private households, including 19% who lived with family members. Another 18% stayed in private rented accommodation and only 14% remained in reception centers. Many Europeans also helped indirectly, donating money, food, and clothing to support Ukrainians in their communities.

Challenges remain for Ukrainians and local host communities

Despite the unprecedented legal and political frameworks and the positive societal reception, the response to Ukrainian displacement has not been without challenges — for national and municipal governments, host communities, and Ukrainians themselves. First, the legal framework provided by the TPD at the EU level still left national governments responsible for implementation, leading to discrepancies in the accessibility of rights and benefits across different states. Granting Ukrainians the freedom to choose where to settle led to a greatly unequal distribution of refugees across and within EU states. In early August 2023, the UNHCR recorded the highest numbers of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Italy across the EU. This correlated with the largest diaspora communities across Europe prior to the war present in those five countries.

Though many Ukrainian children initially continued their education from home via Zoom, localities scrambled to offer sufficient enrollment opportunities in local kindergartens and schools, as granted by the TPD. This entailed not only creating physical classroom space but also helping them understand content and learn the host country language in schools. In Poland and Germany, the two largest hosting countries, this came against a backdrop of existing teacher shortages. Host cities were similarly challenged to offer enough language courses for adults, a prerequisite for finding employment and integrating into community life. For locals who opened their homes to refugees as host families, the prolonged conflict and future uncertainty continued to strain private assets.

Stuck in a state of limbo, [Ukrainian refugees] try to navigate a viable path between integrating into host communities and maintaining the goal of returning home.

Ukrainians nevertheless face significant hardships despite Europe’s unprecedented warm welcome. Where shortages of language courses existed, refugees were unable to access opportunities to qualify for jobs or continue their education. Absent child care, adults were further hindered in seeking employment. Yet even when language and child care were established, strict regulations in select host countries prevented Ukrainians from accessing work in accordance with their qualifications. Nevertheless, some countries have taken advantage of the refugees’ presence to address labor shortages in key sectors. For example, Poland has launched an initiative to facilitate the integration of qualified Ukrainian refugees into its understaffed health and medical sector, which could serve as a template for other sectors and other European countries.

Finally, the psychological burden of displacement and violence weighs heavily on Ukrainians. Many families remain separated, as men aged 18-60 years are prohibited from leaving the country and those groups with special vulnerabilities face difficulties in leaving their homes. For refugees living in Europe, coping with and processing their war experiences as well as planning for an uncertain future are paramount mental struggles. Stuck in a state of limbo, they try to navigate a viable path between integrating into host communities and maintaining the goal of returning home.

Increasing arrivals to Europe amidst a sharp rise in forced displacement globally

While the shock of the Ukraine war and the displacement triggered by it dominated public discussions last year, Europe also saw near-record numbers of non-Ukrainian asylum applications and irregular arrivals. Excluding Ukrainians covered under the TPD, almost 1 million people applied for international protection in 2022 across the EU — an increase of over 60% compared to 2021 and the highest since 2016. The IOM reported that over 189,000 migrants and asylum-seekers arrived irregularly by land and sea in 2022 — also the highest since 2016. Arrivals for the first half of 2023 are already 54% higher than in 2022.

A key cause of asylum applications and irregular arrivals to the EU is dramatically rising global forced displacement over the past decade and the expansion of existing and new migration routes through North Africa, particularly Libya and Tunisia. The number of people forcibly displaced globally surpassed 100 million in 2022. By the end of 2023, the UNHCR estimates that number will reach over 117 million, with roughly half of those internally displaced and half displaced across international borders. Whereas 1 in 167 people were displaced in 2012, 1 in 77 were in 2022. Conflict, violence, persecution, human rights violations, and political turmoil remain the top drivers of displacement. Worsening climate change, inflationary macroeconomic shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and flagging domestic economies helmed by debt-burdened governments are also all driving food insecurity and poverty that in turn contribute to rising internal and external migration.

Scholars and analysts have described current movements to Europe as “mixed migration” due to the different legal statuses of people arriving. Indeed, unlike those individuals who are fleeing conflict and persecution and thus have the right to asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention and EU and domestic laws, others may not be afforded such rights. For example, people who are migrating in search of better livelihoods or who have been displaced by climate change and natural disasters may be protected under international human rights law, but they do not necessarily have access to asylum                                                                                                           Figure 3      https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends  Open Link to see figures!

 
In response to heightened numbers of arrivals of refugees primarily fleeing war in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan along with other asylum-seekers and migrants in 2014 and 2015, the EU implemented restrictive border enforcement measures and increased its aid and enforcement support to transit countries such as Turkey and Libya. While Europe promised to also expand safe migration and refugee resettlement pathways, such promises largely failed to materialize. Irregular arrivals subsequently declined from over 1 million in 2015 to fewer than 190,000 in 2017. Yet even with intensified enforcement and funding for often-abusive detention centers in Libya, migration to Europe through Libya and Tunisia has been sharply increasing since 2019. These routes, part of the broader Central Mediterranean route, are notoriously deadly. Even prior to the June 14 shipwreck, the UNHCR estimated that 1 in 6 people departing North Africa die on their journeys. With few other options, however, arrivals through this route are set to outpace 2022. Non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers arriving in Europe over the past year faced a wholly different reality than Ukrainian refugees. The greatest challenge for people seeking protection not covered by the TPD remains the complex and dysfunctional legal framework. On paper, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) establishes EU-wide standards regarding the processing of applications, conditions of reception, and qualifications for protection. Moreover, the Dublin Regulation lays out a mechanism that assigns responsibility for asylum-seekers to their first EU country of arrival. In practice, however, many asylum-seekers who originally set foot in outer-EU states continue their journeys throughout the bloc — warranted by free movement across borders within the Schengen Area — into inner-EU countries before registering with national authorities, contrary to Dublin. Since the 1990s, the bloc has unsuccessfully tried to create a functional EU-wide refugee distribution mechanism. Some countries have internal systems that assign asylum-seekers to different regions, accounting for the size of the native population and economic capacity, such as the “Königstein Key“ in Germany. The recent EU agreement for a new asylum and migration pact envisions such a distribution mechanism that divides the responsibility of hosting asylum-seekers more equally across member states. It also includes a provision that offers countries to opt out of hosting in exchange for a 20,000-euro payment per individual into a common fund. Nonetheless, Poland and Hungary have already voiced objections, raising questions over whether negotiations between the council and the Parliament can successfully transform the proposal into law. As with the TPD, implementation disparities exist across EU countries with respect to the provision of reception services, availability of integration offerings, and general treatment of and attitudes towards asylum-seekers during and after the review process. Research shows that refugees prefer certain destinations over others, based on a combination of family and network ties, previous levels of asylum applications in the country, the perceived openness toward newcomers, and accessibility of support services and labor market opportunities. As a result, many countries in northwestern Europe have witnessed disproportionate arrivals of asylum-seekers. Over the last decade, Germany has been the largest receiving country in the EU, with over 240,000 asylum applicants in 2022 — on top of over 1 million Ukrainians arriving under the TPD. Hungary, by contrast, has pursued a strict “zero refugee“ policy and passed contested laws preventing people from seeking asylum in the country and instead outsourcing the procedure to Hungarian embassies abroad, violating international and EU law. At the forefront of increasing arrivals, however, several southern European countries — most notably Italy, Greece, and Spain — also are facing serious strains on their local reception capacities, resulting in demands for more solidarity and collective “burden-sharing” across the EU.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Figure 4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/TPS00191/default/table?lang=en Open Link to see figures! 

Dysfunctional policies foil effective support and integration of non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers

Complex national legal frameworks around the asylum process, lower collective civil society and political resources compared to the Ukrainian response, and severe local housing and staffing shortages all threaten the current response for non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers. For the EU, the focus has been on securitization of borders and removal of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers, rather than protection of rights and physical safety. While there is wide variation between host countries, current policies broadly fail to adequately support individuals both during the asylum process and once they have achieved refugee status in building lives and integrating.

First, the asylum process itself differs sharply from the immediate legal protections extended to Ukrainians. As arrivals and applications increased, national authorities have struggled to expand their adjudication capabilities, creating a backlog of total pending cases that reached 877,725 by the end of 2022. Across Europe, insufficient staffing within asylum processing offices over the years has prolonged waiting times and squeezed resources for service provision. During the review and even when asylum claims are recognized, severe shortages in social workers prevent asylees from receiving adequate legal advice and accessing protection and integration measures, starting with language courses and extending to counseling and community engagement.                                                                                                  Figure 5    https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/MIGR_ASYPENCTZM__custom_6999707/default/table?lang=en Open Link to see figures!

Second, finding housing spaces presents one of the biggest challenges at the local level of host municipalities. Unlike Ukrainians, most other asylum-seekers are accommodated in collective shelters pending review of their applications. Depending on the host country, these may vary from empty group homes or gymnasiums divided by cardboard walls into small cubicles with bunk beds to small container or tent villages, as is often the case in Germany. In the worst cases, asylum-seekers reside in unprotected outside encampments or detention-like prisons, as recently uncovered in Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Greece.

Asylum-seekers thirdly face barriers to the labor market both while waiting for asylum decisions and after asylum is approved. The CEAS generally prohibits asylum-seekers from obtaining work permits for the first nine months after filing an application or until a positive asylum decision has been granted, with the intent to limit economic migration. Some countries have shortened this wait to six or three months. Other national limitations include the condition that no native or permanent resident of the host country could fill the job, restrictions on employment access for asylum-seekers arriving from “safe third countries” until a positive decision has been granted, and benefit reductions proportional to employment earnings. Beyond legal restrictions, studies show that long waiting times in the asylum procedure negatively affect the chances of employment for refugees in the year after receiving protection status, not least because of the psychological impact.

Even if asylum-seekers are not repatriated, a sharply increasing proportion of asylum-seekers — including from Syria and Afghanistan, which continue to face protracted violence and wars — are being granted subsidiary protection rather than refugee status. Within the EU, subsidiary protection is applied to individuals who governments argue do not meet the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee, yet who still face a serious threat of harm in their home country. Individuals who receive subsidiary protection must generally apply for residency renewal more frequently, creating additional bureaucratic burdens. For example, in Austria, subsidiary protection residency permits are valid for one year compared to three years for refugee status, while in France subsidiary protection recipients have four-year residency permits compared to 10 years for refugees. In some countries, such as Greece, having subsidiary protection instead of refugee status prevents individuals from applying for family reunification.

Individuals who receive either refugee status or subsidiary protection face additional barriers to integration and accessing employment. Research has found that national dispersal policies constitute an impediment to successful labor market integration, with asylum-seekers and refugees sometimes located in rural areas with weak local labor markets. Language barriers, lack of information and recruitment support, recognition of qualifications, and remote locations of accommodation centers further hinder asylum-seekers and refugees’ efforts to acquire employment.

Non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers and refugees are frequently physically and psychologically impacted by both displacement and their experience in hosting countries — ultimately affecting integration.

Non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers and refugees are frequently physically and psychologically impacted by both displacement and their experience in hosting countries — ultimately affecting integration. First, the long asylum procedure timeline condemns refugees to a prolonged state of uncertainty about whether they will be given protection status or sent home, prompting anxiety and mental stress. Second, when stuck in over-securitized or under-resourced encampments, asylum-seekers in many EU border countries are often at risk of violence and exploitation and are deprived of basic hygiene conditions and medical support. Even in more stable collective houses, gymnasiums, or containers, the lack of privacy, restless communal environment, and overcrowded spaces amplify psychological distress. For years, human rights organizations have criticized that standards of reception and accommodation of asylum-seekers undercut basic human dignity. Finally, research has shown that delays in family reunification create heightened incidences of mental disorders, inhibiting integration.

Notably, societal attitudes in host communities also differ with respect to non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers coming primarily from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Racial and religious bias — conscious and unconscious — have contributed to the more frigid reception of non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers. Further, the economic and geopolitical consequences of the war in Ukraine directly affected Europeans, creating sympathy and giving them a stake in the Ukrainians’ cause, whereas the drivers of non-Ukrainian displacement are more distant. The sharp increase in asylum-seeker arrivals across Europe in 2015 and 2016 initially generated significant government and civil society mobilization to provide resources for newcomers, particularly after the highly publicized photo of two-year-old Syrian refugee Alan Kurdi’s body on a Turkish shore in September 2015. Yet the response varied widely across Europe, and even positive mobilization diminished or was met with the counter-mobilization of civil society groups opposed to the arrival of asylum-seekers. The current relatively weaker social mobilization for non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers has had concrete implications for both pressure on governments for political action and resources and resulted in lower complementary civil society support — support that has been key in helping Ukrainian refugees.

The TPD as a guide for reforming Europe’s asylum policy

Since the start of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, observers have highlighted Europe’s “double standard” toward Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees and asylum-seekers. While Ukrainians were swiftly greeted with expansive legal protections, asylum-seekers from countries such as Syria who have also fled the horrors of war and repression were not met with similar policies even at the height of the Syrian civil war in 2015. The current patterns of non-Ukrainian arrivals and asylum applications are more mixed compared to 2015 and 2016. Climate change and environmental disasters are increasingly contributing to displacement alongside violence, persecution, and economic challenges — but legal frameworks have yet to catch up with this new reality.

Equitable treatment does not mean a suspension of asylum adjudication processes. Instead, analysts and advocates have argued that it means applying the principles that have driven the Ukraine response of viewing protections for individuals fleeing conflict and repression as part of Europe’s responsibility both under international law and the democratic norms of inclusion it espouses. All EU countries — with the exception of Hungary — committed to the U.N. Global Compact on Refugees in 2018. While not legally binding, the compact aims to strengthen solidarity among host countries and adequate conditions to foster refugees’ independence and self-reliance and reflects the urgency and benefits of more inclusionary policies toward refugees and asylum-seekers. Yet at land and at sea, European countries regularly push back non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers regardless of the potential validity of their claims. The legal rights of asylum-seekers once they arrive in many countries across Europe — such as Poland — stand in stark contrast to the mass political and social mobilization that has met Ukrainian refugees.

As this brief demonstrates, however, the effects of this disparity extend beyond Europe’s failure to adhere to its own pluralistic values and violations of human rights and international law at borders. They have concrete consequences for localities struggling with the implementation of national-level frameworks and for local economies and asylum-seeker integration. During the asylum application stage, the prevalence of detention centers, staffing shortages for asylum application processing, and limitations on asylum-seekers’ ability to work create deep burdens for asylum-seekers themselves and challenges for localities. After an asylum application is approved, unequal fiscal resources for housing and relatively limited civil society and social worker support services facilitating asylum-seeker access to the labor markets all hinder integration and strain local service systems.

Lessons from the experiences of asylum-seekers following the 2015 European refugee crisis and the successes of the Ukraine refugee response offer a policy roadmap to improve Europe’s approach to migration, asylum, and integration.

First, discussing the future of asylum in Europe requires recognizing that migration policies adopted at national and international levels are realized at the local level. The disconnect between policy design and execution leads to challenges in local host communities to respond effectively to large-scale arrivals of people seeking protection, especially if the legal frameworks and available support are distinct for different refugee and asylum-seeker populations within the same country. Bridging this divide requires an active role for municipal and local host governments, civil society, and refugee leaders in communicating the specific challenges they face and informing policy. This includes actions such as increasing local input on building initiatives to address severe local affordable housing shortages in many localities across Europe. In a 2020 policy brief for the European Migration and Diversity Programme, researchers including Brookings event speaker Petra Bendel highlighted how local leaders are already informing policy through city networks and ad hoc collaboration with national and EU actors and called for formally institutionalizing policy input mechanisms.

The Ukrainian response and previous research secondly demonstrate the strong connection between the asylum adjudication process and local integration. The psychological and skills loss impacts of detention centers, long delays in asylum processing, the experiences of living in substandard or even unsafe collective housing, and limited access to social workers all factor into asylum-seekers’ experiences of integration once refugee status is granted. The current EU proposal to detain asylum-seekers for months in border facilities as part of the new asylum process is not grounded in evidence of detention’s significant negative impacts. Instead, as many organizations such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles have argued, building on what has worked in the Ukrainian context, such as the rapid legal temporary status process and securing less crowded housing facilities, will ultimately benefit both refugees and communities. Decisions on legal status allow localities to progress on issues of employment, education, and service allocation. Extending the purchase and provision of private residential facilities by municipalities, as dominant in the Ukrainian response, to non-Ukrainian asylum-seekers would further benefit local administrators in securing long-term affordable housing spaces, even beyond temporary migrant influxes.

Third, there is no “one-size-fits-all” formula for facilitating local inclusion and integration. Age, gender, family and medical status, language and cultural background, and reasons for fleeing their country of origin all shape what conditions asylum-seekers find themselves in, the challenges they face, and what support they require in host communities. In the Ukrainian response, factors including the large diaspora and language training along with the ability to settle in locations of their choosing helped early community inclusion efforts. While many non-Ukrainian refugees also have existing and growing diasporas, such as Syrians in Germany, distribution policies place individuals and families in communities where they often have no existing ties. In a policy brief, researchers from the Migration Policy Institute highlighted the importance of both early and sustained forums for refugee-host community interaction, particularly in rural areas with less racial and national diversity. Investing additional resources in these forums and expanding civil society outreach, including to groups that are working primarily with Ukrainian refugees, is a concrete action national and local governments can take.

Fourth, fostering inclusion and integration also means facilitating asylum-seekers and refugees to lead community-building efforts and engage in the labor market. In the case of Ukrainian refugees, immediate legal status, proactive efforts at job matching, private sector-public partnerships, and extensive education and language training opportunities have all helped quick labor market entry. An IOM survey of Ukrainian refugees found that language was the key barrier to work, while education level did not correlate with employment levels. While there is wider variation within the EU in opportunities for non-Ukrainian refugees, support programs have also recorded success. In Sweden, a two-year program for refugees helps them with intensive language training and work placement. Expanding such programs and reducing or eliminating wait times for labor participation for asylum-seekers and refugees is key, particularly given the severe labor shortages in countries across Europe.

Fifth, pursuing a functional “dual intent” policy is critical for host governments, for both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees and asylum-seekers. For Ukrainians, governments must guarantee protection and successful integration as the war continues, while also implementing structures to facilitate refugees’ return upon the war’s end. Return will be a crucial part of Ukraine’s future economic and societal reconstruction — the country was already facing an aging population and diminishing labor force before the war. Some observers have argued that the arrival of Ukrainian refugees cannot be viewed as a sustainable solution to labor market challenges. Yet as the lessons of many previous refugee crises have shown, the causes of displacement can extend for years, decades, or an entire lifetime. Premature attempts at return, as in the case of Denmark attempting to refoul Syrian refugees, cause direct harm and create a broader environment of fear and uncertainty for refugees navigating life in their host societies. The EU must take a strong stand against the premature repatriation of refugees by its member states.

Finally, as many have argued, EU asylum policy should extend beyond borders to expand safe pathways for refugees and asylum-seekers and help them avoid the trauma of deadly journeys and smuggler abuse. Researchers such as Jeff Crisp have highlighted the lack of evidence on the causal connection between expanded safe pathways and reducing irregular migrant and asylum-seekers arrivals — in part because so few pathways have been introduced. Expanding refugee resettlement and complementary programs such as labor visas that help individuals reach Europe from both origin countries and first-destination countries of refuge will not stop irregular arrivals completely. Nor are they a substitute for the right to claim asylum under international law. But expanded refugee resettlement will help localities plan more effectively around refugee arrivals and ensure the most vulnerable — such as women and families — who often cannot undertake the journey to Europe can access protection. Many promised pathways, such as in response to the 2021 Afghan refugee displacement, have not been implemented. Refugee resettlement should be significantly increased, along with complementary programs such as Talent Partnerships that create labor and education mobility pathways for non-EU countries.

As negotiations continue over the new migration and asylum pact, Europe has a chance to build a better future for asylum and refugee integration policy...

There are few signs that the causes of growing global forced displacement and mixed migration will abate in the near future. Ongoing violence and persecution in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan will prevent many from returning home, and recently intensifying violence in Sudan has displaced millions. Many refugees, such as Syrians in the Middle East, are facing intensifying pressure to leave the countries neighboring Syria where they have sought shelter, and in surveys are expressing increased desires to migrate to Europe and other destinations. Climate change, economic inequality, and weak domestic governments and economies are pushing many more to leave their homes in search of better lives. The recent suspension of the U.N. and Turkey-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) and Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports threaten to once again limit commodity supplies and raise global food prices, worsening already-dire international food insecurity. The U.N. World Food Program sourced 80% of its wheat from Ukraine when the deal was terminated. This grim global picture only underscores the need for Europe to formulate a functional policy that accounts for the humanitarian dimension of displacement rather than focusing on detaining and pushing asylum-seekers back.

As negotiations continue over the new migration and asylum pact, Europe has a chance to build a better future for asylum and refugee integration policy that supports both asylum-seekers and refugees as well as local communities across Europe with aging populations and growing labor shortages. The Ukraine response has demonstrated the power of collective political and social will in welcoming a population fleeing the violence of war. European policymakers must keep these lessons in mind and the extensive research that shows that asylum-seekers and refugees can positively contribute to European societies and build lives for themselves if given support and protection.

Authors

 


Βίας ο Πριηνεύς: Άκουγε πολλά, μίλα την ώρα που πρέπει.

Θαλής o Μιλήσιος: Καλύτερα να σε φθονούν παρά να σε λυπούνται.

Κλεόβουλος ο Λίνδιος: Το μέτρο είναι άριστο.

Περίανδρος ο Κορίνθιος: Οι ηδονές είναι θνητές, οι αρετές αθάνατες.

Πιττακός ο Μυτιληναίος: Με την ανάγκη δεν τα βάζουν ούτε οι θεοί.

Σωκράτης: Εν οίδα ότι ουδέν οίδα. Ουδείς εκών κακός.

Θουκυδίδης: Δύο τα εναντιότατα ευβουλία είναι, τάχος τε και οργήν.

Πλάτων: Άγνοια, η ρίζα και ο μίσχος όλου του κακού. 

Αριστοτέλης: Δεν υπάρχει τίποτε πιο άνισο από την ίση μεταχείριση των ανίσων.